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RUSSIAN EXPANSION IN THE CAUCASUS AND GEORGIA

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Editor-in-chief: Giorgi Cheishvili

Editor-corrector: Tinatin Evdoshvili

Project author: Irakli Gegechkori

Designer: Tornike Bokuchava



Otar Janelidze

MILITARY AGGRESSION OF SOVIET RUSSIA AGAINST GEORGIA (MAY 1920)



In November 1917, a new state appeared on the world political map – the Soviet Republic of Russia. Through violence, the Bolshevik Party emerged as the leading force of the new country. The country's Bolshevik government, under Lenin, found itself in diplomatic isolation since foreign states doubted its legitimacy; refusing to recognize the newly created state, which from the very beginning was embroiled in a fierce struggle for power, armed confrontation, and civil war.


When the National Council declared Georgia's state independence on May 26, 1918, and established a democratic republic, bloodshed, destruction and chaos were still raging in Russia. Lenin and the Bolsheviks shared the idea of the self-determination of nations, but after seizing power, they took

the path of maintaining Russia's integrity and indivisibility. Therefore, Soviet Russia was dissatisfied with the secession, first of Transcaucasia and then Georgia, although it did not react sharply. At first, the difficult internal situation kept the Kremlin back from undertaking decisive moves towards the periphery of the empire, with Moscow forced to take into account the fact that first German and then British troops were stationed in Georgia, and also the fact that the fate of the Georgian Democratic Republic had not yet been decided at the Paris Peace Conference.

Georgia's independence was not met with hostility in Moscow; however, the country's highest political circles still perceived Georgia as an integral part of Russia, and its sovereignty was viewed dubiously. Lenin believed that



A session of the Constituent Assembly of Georgia. Tbilisi, 1919



The Declaration of Independence of Georgia, adopted by the session of the National Assembly of Georgia on May 26, 1918 and approved by the Constituent Assembly of Georgia on March 12, 1919

"Georgia's independence ... is in fact the occupation and complete conquest of Georgia by German imperialists,"¹ while Stalin added: "We cannot legitimize the independence of a Georgia recognized by Germany."

The Russian Communist establishment, without any justification, declared: "We do not recognize Georgia's independence because the majority of the Georgian people do not approve of it."

They themselves acquired power through bloodshed and the deception of the people, at the same time forcibly expelling the legitimate founding assembly.

The ruling forces of Soviet Russia and the Democratic Republic of Georgia were of common origin. Both Bolshevism and Menshevism (The Georgian Social Democracy aligned itself to this ideology) were rooted in the Russian Social Democratic Party (RSDMP), which emerged in 1903. Over the years, representatives of both convictions had been part of the same organization, serving common goals and collaborating, and obviously knew each other well. After the Bolsheviks, under Lenin, took control of the Russian state, and the people handed over Georgia's political governance to the Social Democrats, the old party members parted ways and their friendship was forgotten.²



A group of Georgian and German officers. Tbilisi, 1918

Soviet Russia showed complete disregard for Georgia during the peace talks with Germany and the signing of the Treaty of Brest on March 3, 1918. No Georgian representative was invited and the territorial issue (surrender of the Kars, Ardagan and Batumi districts to the Ottomans) was also resolved without any consent from Georgia.

The Democratic Republic of Georgia sought to establish peaceful, good-neighborly relations with all surrounding countries, including Soviet Russia. Tbilisi did not rule out the possibility of political and economic cooperation with its northern neighbor; even actively sought such ways, with the precondition of its recognizing Georgia's state independence.

Meanwhile, the rulers of Soviet Russia set out to prepare the ground for the intervention of Georgia by creating a fifth column, to expand their social and political base. The local

Bolshevik organizations, Abkhaz and Ossetian groups of pro-Bolshevik orientation, sections of the Russian and Armenian population living in Georgia, the Russian clergy and the Russian National Council with their explicit anti-Georgian spirit, were to play a primary role in the activities of the fifth column. The latter was officially entrusted by the Kremlin to protect the interests of Russian citizens in the South Caucasus, although, throughout its existence, the Council had been more concerned with fighting Georgian statehood than caring for its fellow Russians.

The goals and activities of all these entities were well known to the authorities of the Democratic Republic of Georgia. There was no doubt that Soviet Russia was behind the Bolshevik demonstrations in various parts of Georgia (including uprisings in Dusheti uyezd, Abkhazia, and the Ossetian-populated communities of Shida Kartli, etc.).



The signing of the Treaty of Brest. March 3, 1918

According to Noe Jordania, Bolshevik Russia opposed Georgia "ideologically and nationally." The government made sure that "the propaganda of the Muscovites did not reach the people, that there was no confusion of ideas and ways, that the broad masses understood a difference between our and their way of life."³

The Georgian government sent a diplomatic envoy to Russia in 1918, but the Georgian envoy, Gabriel Khundadze, was not allowed to work there properly.


The Russian Bolshevik government avoided any connection with Georgia, even banned its representation in Moscow, and finally arrested the head of the mission and imprisoned him in June 1919.⁴

The provocations of the Bolsheviks, sometimes covert and sometimes obviously aggressive toward Georgia, did not result in anti-Russian hysteria, or the persecution or deportation of the Russian population. On the contrary, many members of the Russian intelligentsia, who had fled the proletarian regime from their homeland, found a cozy shelter in Georgia and continued to work.



***Noe Jordania
(1868 — 1953)***

The political forces in Georgia well understood the essence of the Bolshevik regime. They perceived Bolshevism as a reactionary ideology, completely unacceptable for the goals and ideals of the Georgian nation. The newspaper "Georgia" rightly remarked: "No matter what color prevails in Russia (red, white or green), one thing is clear: Russia will not change its imperial attitude towards Georgia."⁵



Newspaper "Georgia". May 26, 1918

The Georgian political elite was aware of the aggressive nature of Bolshevism, sensed the seriousness of the threat posed by it, and sought to achieve peaceful relations with Soviet Russia while building up the country's defense capabilities. The same cannot be said of the Russian ruling power, which was possessed by the idea of a world proletarian revolution and planned to implement Bolshevism in the Middle East through Georgia, the East being the main destination for the export of socialist revolution.

"The revolution has stalled in the West. We must ignite the East, revolt the poor of Turkey, Persia, India, and stir up Afghanistan!" – wrote one of the most prominent revolutionaries and Bolshevik figures of that time, N. Podvoisky.⁶

The Kremlin believed that "Tbilisi should play the role of Moscow in the East", but before that, it was necessary to Sovietize Georgia. Two projects were developed in Moscow for this purpose. The first was to achieve the task by peaceful means, and the second by military intervention. Which of these projects would be preferred and implemented with full intensity largely depended upon the international situation, as well as how events would unfold in Russia and Georgia. Preparation was ongoing in both directions.

In early 1920, Lenin offered the Georgian government a military alliance against the volunteer army. By accepting this proposal, Georgia would be dragged into the Russian Civil War, thereby violating the principle of neutrality it had earlier declared, and bringing new complications to the Republic. Noe Jordania sent an unambiguous refusal to Moscow. The Kremlin was dissatisfied by the response, but in the spring of the same year, V. Lenin agreed with the proposal of the Georgian government to start negotiations on the mutual recognition of states. For this purpose, Grigol Uratadze, a member of the Constituent Assembly, was sent from Georgia to Moscow. The defense of Russia's interests was entrusted to Lev Karakhan, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

As Chairman of the Government, Noe Jordania gave a directive to G. Uratadze, according to which the representative of Georgia was to request recognition of Georgia's independence and the inviolability of its borders by Russia. All other issues, according to N. Jordania, were secondary and possible to resolve through negotiations.⁷

The Kremlin had in mind that if diplomatic talks did not achieve the desired result, they would at least divert Georgia's attention, and in that case the military intervention plan would become more effective.⁸

Before G. Uratadze could reach Moscow, Soviet Russian troops penetrated the South Caucasus after the destruction of a volunteer army in the Don and the North Caucasus. They carried out the first military operation in the region against the Republic of Azerbaijan at the end of April 1920. At that time, a large portion of the Azerbaijani army was deployed to quell the uprising in Karabakh. As the country's Musavat government did not put up much resistance to Bolshevik intervention, Soviet rule was established in Azerbaijan without complications.



Lev Karakhan
(1889 – 1937)



Grigol Uratadze
(1878 – 1959)

V. Lenin and L. Trotsky were careful because they expected Georgia to help Azerbaijan,⁹ while Stalin insisted: "Georgians will not be dangerous if we offer them neutrality."¹⁰

The victory of the Soviet regime in Azerbaijan was an alarming signal for Georgia, with the threat of Bolshevism suddenly becoming all too real.

After the success achieved in Azerbaijan, Sergo Orjonikidze, who was tasked with political leadership of the military operations against the Caucasus, believed that Georgia would also be easily dealt with. He deployed troops towards the borders of the Democratic Republic of Georgia and, convinced that they would capture the capital in 10-12 days, sent a telegram to Moscow – "I will be in Tbilisi in a few days", "everything will turn out brilliantly."

Soviet army regiments invaded Georgia from the side of the Red Bridge in early May 1920. The hostilities, the details of

which we will not discuss here, lasted more than two weeks.

In addition to military force, the Kremlin was also planning to provoke internal unrest in Georgia. Preparations were underway for an armed uprising in areas densely populated by Ossetians in Shida Kartli. The Junkers Military School was attacked in Tbilisi on the night of May 2, 1920, a move intended to cause countrywide panic and chaos.

The intelligence of the Democratic Republic of Georgia, which according to P. Sitin, the military attaché of Soviet Russia in Georgia, was an outstanding organization,¹¹ missed the Bolsheviks' planning of the attack on the Military School. A well-armed group of ten Bolsheviks stormed the school, disarmed the guards, and captured some of the sleeping junkers. Several guards escaped the attackers and reported the incident to the school administration, who were living on the school premises. General Giorgi Kvinitadze and Colonel Alexander Chkheidze, supported by cadets living in other barracks, directly engaged in repelling the attackers. In the heated shooting, some of the attackers were killed, some were captured, and several managed to escape.¹² Two junkers were wounded – Grigol Kikiani and Mikheil Makashvili. Makashvili died the next day.¹³

The failed attempt to stir up the internal state of affairs in Georgia prompted Moscow to be more cautious, more so considering Josef Pilsudski had just attacked from Poland and had taken Kiev. At the same time, Baron Wrangel became active in Crimea and landed his troops in Kuban. The capacity of Bolsheviks to fight on another front would have been limited. In addition, the British Foreign Secretary Curzon demanded that Moscow suspend military operations in the South Caucasus. Three South Caucasus republics (Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) were de facto recognized by the Allies in January 1920.

On behalf of Lenin and Stalin, Sergo Orjonikidze was ordered to cease fire on May 5, 1920. The telegram states: "The Central Committee instructs you to withdraw troops from Georgia to the border and refrain from attacking Georgia. After negotiations with Tbilisi, it is clear that a truce with Georgia is not ruled out."¹⁴

It is noteworthy that Soviet Russia not only chose not to declare war on the Democratic Republic of Georgia, but also denied the involvement of its military units in the alleged Azerbaijan-Georgia conflict and, moreover, tried to hide the fact that the Red Army had invaded Georgia.

Official information transmitted from Tbilisi to the representative in Moscow was intentionally blocked and could not reach G. Uratadze, and the Georgian envoy only heard about the war from a private source. Uratadze wrote: "I immediately



S. Orjonikidze (in the middle). Baku, 1919

appealed to Lenin ...and told him that if he would not issue an ordinance to end the war, then I was prepared to abandon the peace talks." At first, Lenin denied it, saying he knew nothing about the war. He clarified information through Abel Enukidze with People's Commissar for Military, L. Trotsky, and received a same reply from him, that "no war is being waged". After this, Lenin said to Uratadze: "You see, nothing has happened and rumors should not interfere with the negotiations."¹⁵

That the war with Georgia was real and not a rumor, Lenin knew from S. Orjonikidze's above mentioned telegram. But to put this aside, the leadership of Soviet Russia had already received several official notes from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Georgia. In the first note, Tbilisi welcomed the Kremlin's statement on the inviolability of the country's borders, but added that the aspirations of the central government were contradicted by the aggressive action perpetrated by the representative of the Bolshevik government in Kavkaz and Baku against Georgia. The second note directly indicated that the 287th and 288th Regiments of the XI Red Army of Russia stationed in Azerbaijan were acting against Georgia.¹⁶

There are other archival documents that illuminate the Kremlin's aggression against Georgia. During the talks in Moscow, Joseph Stalin and Abel Enukidze explained to Sergo Orjonikidze by direct wire: "There will be no offensive action against Georgia, neither by our (*Russia - O.J.*) nor Azerbaijani detachments, and we will sign an agreement with Georgia on that tomorrow."¹⁷

The attack on Georgia in 1920 was not the rogue initiative of Sergo Orjonikidze, as presented by Soviet historiography. If it were so, and not a campaign organized by the earlier plan of Moscow, then clearly there would have been no need to persuade Orjonikidze to stop the attack once it diverged from the current line of the Central Committee – he would have been simply shot according to the laws of revolution.

The notion that the supreme authority was unaware of the actions of its subordinate military or political officials is nothing more than a disguise of the official course, and typical of Russia. Today it is no longer a secret, since the Leninist directive issued in 1920 is well known. It states: "Troops must be deployed by order of the front or the army and/or in the name of the front or the army, but not in the name of the government."¹⁸

The Kremlin's military action plan and strategy had been revealed. It was expected that this would lead to the disruption of negotiations with Georgia. In fact, nothing turned out "brilliantly"; Georgia did not give up easily, and instead



Georgian Junkers Military School, Tbilisi



***Giorgi Kvinitadze
(1874 — 1970)***



***Alexander Chkheidze
(1878 — 1940)***


responded appropriately. In addition, the changed situation in Russia forced S. Orjonikidze to stop the attack.

The aggressor was supposed to end the fighting under a peace treaty signed between Soviet Russia and the Georgian Democratic Republic on May 7, 1920, but the clashes continued. The Georgian armed forces repelled and pushed back the enemy. The “blitzkrieg” ended unsuccessfully for Russia.¹⁹

Did Georgian politicians realize the essence of the aggressive action of Soviet Russia at that time? Of course, they did, and the government took additional measures. Among other moves, it strengthened state borders, announced mobilization, including for university students, fully mobilized the People's Guard, introduced martial law in eastern Georgia, and established a defense fund.²⁰ General Giorgi Kvinitadze was appointed Commander of the Georgian Military Units, who immediately took vigorous action and appropriately regrouped the country's forces.

The Constituent Assembly of Georgia passed a resolution and allocated an additional 300 million Manet to the government for the defense needs of the republic. Authorities also used international contacts. The Georgian official delegation to the Paris Peace Conference informed the Supreme Council of the Allies and requested help from the Western states.

The ruling Social Democratic Party also sent special messages to the Second International, the International Trade Union Bureau and the socialist parties of all countries.²¹ All the



Jozef Pilsudski
(1867 – 1935)


opposition forces organized and prepared. The representatives of intelligentsia, students, writers, the arts, and other sections of society pledged support to the government. The periodical press was also galvanized. The Federalist newspaper *Sakhalkho Sakme* was the first to publish an article on the Bolshevik attack against Azerbaijan on April 28, calling on the Georgian government and people to be vigilant. Those same days, the same newspaper wrote: "The conquering power is coming, with socialism written on its flag, ... but in reality, this socialism loves red power, and in its essence carries all the features of Russian imperialism."²²

The same publication called the incident "an adventure of the Red Tatars", who were Moscow's allies, and also noted:

"When the central government of the Communists is in a peace talks with us, it is impossible for "Azerbaijan's ridiculous 'Red' army to act independently."²³

"Bolshevik Russia and the nationalist Ottomans united in the 'Republican' Azerbaijan," the Georgian press reported. Numerous noteworthy publications were published by the then National Democratic newspapers *Sakartvelo* and the Russian-language *Gruzia*. The periodical of the Social Democratic Party *Ertoba* considered the attack on Georgia as a "reckless adventure" launched by the Azerbaijani Communists,²⁴ It wrote: "Pasha's agents, gathered under the auspices of Tatar communism in Baku, invaded Georgia," and that "we are dealing with a communist Azerbaijan with turbans, which came under the banner of the crescent moon".²⁵

It was impossible for the newspaper's editorial office not to be aware of the real architect of the aggression against Georgia, but it seems that it was following the government's tactical line, about which Noe Jordania later wrote: "There was a great panic in Tbilisi at that time. People were saying - Russian is coming, and no one would be able to withstand them! Since the main combat force was the Guard [Jordania had little faith in the regular army and therefore noted the superiority of the Guard – O.J.], as a resolutely anti-Bolshevik organization, we decided to strengthen its morale by spreading the rumor that on the march was not the Russian but the Azerbaijani army, following the orders of the Azerbaijani government. The tactic was successful. The guards were energized, exclaiming – how



General G. Kvinitadze with German officers, 1919



The entrance of the 11th Army units in Baku, 1919

do these “Chachnis” dare to fight us? The first clash took place at the Red Bridge, the enemy was defeated by the Guard. After the fight, the guardsmen were noted in confusion that the Tatars had fled and the Russians mixed among them were killed by making a suicide run against us; all Russians, not a single Azerbaijani, were among the dead.”²⁶

When it made no sense to hide the truth any longer, the *Ertoba* publicists also directly stated: “We know the Russian soldier well. For more than a hundred years, they have trampled the conscience of the Georgian nation. We have a free Georgia with a republican system. Georgia’s democracy will fight until the last breath and not allow anyone to abuse it.”²⁷


One will not find any indication of a war, a military conflict or even an incident between the two states in the Treaty of Moscow of May 7, 1920. Clearly, this was no accident: Russia was hiding the fact of aggression. Although the Democratic Republic of Georgia was attacked by the Soviet Russian army, and the two countries were able to reconcile at the behest of Moscow, a truce was also signed between Sovietized Azerbaijan and Georgia in the city of Agstafa on June 12, 1920.

Obviously, the political spectrum of Georgia could not observe all these vicissitudes indifferently. The transcript of the Constituent Assembly of Georgia has preserved the minutes of the extraordinary session of the supreme legislative body on the Bolshevik attack on Georgia. This meeting was convened on April 30, 1920.

Noe Jordania addressed the MPs at the meeting. He analyzed the tragic events in the neighboring republic and highlighted the dangers that Georgia faced with the loss of allied Azerbaijan. “To allow Bolshevism among us, its reign here, means us becoming [part of] Azerbaijan, that is the domination of Bolshevik-Ottoman imperialism in Georgia. Stepping on the path of Azerbaijan, accepting its political beliefs, will result in the eternal demise of a free and democratic Georgia. It is to forever separate [us] from Europe and [allow us to] fall into the clutches of Asian fanatics,” said the Prime Minister. He added: “If Soviet Russia were to refuse good-neighborly relations, harm everything we hold most sacred, and threaten our borders, then Georgian democracy will prove to the world that it knows not only how to build a state, but also how to protect it.”

In the words of Noe Jordania, “The Bolsheviks are accustomed to an easy victory. For the first time, here, within our borders, they will understand what a heavy defeat means.”²⁸

Shalva Nutsubidze, a well-known scientist and MP from the Federalist Party, delivered a passionate speech. He described Bolshevism as a social phenomenon, spoke of its destructive nature for a small nation, and pointed out that the confrontation between Georgia and Russia revolved around the matter of



The May 7, 1920 peace treaty signed between Soviet Russia and the Democratic Republic of Georgia

statehood. "The Bolsheviks have now aligned with the Ottoman Empire. ... to such force, we can only respond with a sword." On behalf of his party, Nutsubidze noted: "It is true that there is a dissatisfaction among the people, but no-one can use this dissatisfaction, and no-one should try to ignite the fire of anarchy on this ground."²⁹

The speech of Spiridon Kedia, the Chairman of the National Democratic Party, was characterized by a sound analysis of the events. "In the face of imminent danger, it is necessary to overcome narrow partisan interests and unite around the idea of defending the homeland", – he urged.

"The Bolsheviks can do no harm to a well-organized force. They were unable to bring the peoples of Poland and the Baltic states to their knees. These young republics are protecting even the great powers of the West from the scourge of Bolshevism. Georgia has a similar mission in the south, which has been defending its high culture, citizenship, democracy, and parliamentarism for more than two years. But the allied states do not fully understand the importance of Georgia."

The states of Western Europe are obliged to help a nation that is left alone and fighting against Bolshevism. It should be clear to them that if Asia succumbs to the fire of Bolshevism, the positions of Western Europe will be shaken to the ground. If the Entente states provide military assistance to Georgia, the grave of Bolshevism may be dug in our country", – said the leader of the right-wing opposition.³⁰

The words of the socialist-revolutionary Leo Shengelaia were also interesting. He said: "We do not like the Mensheviks, but we love a free, independent Georgia, and that is why we say: we do not care who marches against us – be they the Russian Communists, the Russian Esers, or the Russian Mensheviks. To anyone who takes arms against us, we must respond in a similar vein. It is our duty."

The unanimous spirit of MPs is reflected in the resolution of the supreme legislative body, in which we read: "The Constituent Assembly is deeply convinced that the people of Georgia, regardless of nationality, religion, and conviction, as well as the Georgian nation, democracy of Georgia, its outstanding armed forces and all armed people, will unshakably defend Georgia's independence. The Constituent Assembly calls upon the European democracy to raise its voice in defense of supreme justice, and strongly believes that in times of need, European democracy will not leave Georgia's democracy alone on the battlefield."³¹

The Presidium of the Constituent Assembly addressed with a relevant appeal the people of Georgia, and instructed the Minister of Defense Grigol Lortkipanidze: "Please convey the warm greetings of the Constituent Assembly to the army. The Constituent Assembly expresses its firm belief that the Georgian army will clearly take into account the threat posed to our country by the Russian-Ottoman union and will faithfully defend the freedom of the homeland."³²

In the name of the capital's democracy, Tbilisi City Council promised full support to the government; similar was the pathos



“Garford” and “Austin” armoured cars of the Georgian Armed Forces at the Golovin Avenue (now Rustaveli Avenue). Military parade celebrating the People’s Guard day. December 12, 1920

of the local self-government bodies and the unions in western and eastern Georgia.


The response of the Georgian periodical press was also supportive. This small excerpt can be taken as an example: “The April 30 meeting of the Constituent Assembly represents a parliamentary day, which is vividly inscribed in the heart of the nation. The impending danger united the whole room and enveloped it with one sacred aspiration: to defend the homeland to the last drop of blood. ...When a terrible danger

arose, the voice of the mirror of the nation – its governing body – was heard again. And this voice was like that of a nation that believes in the pride of free existence. The sharp and hopeful voice, the voice of steel and justice.”³³

In the Russian historiography, one can read that the occupation of Azerbaijan by Soviet troops supposedly greatly raised the spirits of the non-Georgian population of Tbilisi, who, it said, were eagerly awaiting the Bolshevik invasion of Georgia.³⁴ This is an obvious exaggeration.



Georgian cavalry near Shulaveri



The map of Georgia, 1920



*Spiridon Kedia
(1884 — 1948)*

The consolidation of the Georgian people, the unity of the whole political spectrum, the fighting spirit of the army and the guards, even without real help from the outside world, enabled Georgia to defend its freedom and independence from the aggression of Georgia's northern neighbor in the spring of 1920. But the small country, abandoned by the Western states, could not garner enough power to stand against the red armies of Soviet Russia in a new attack which came in February-March of the following year.



*Grigol Lortkipanidze
(1881 — 1937)*

Notes:

- ¹ V. Lenin, *Essays*, V. 28, P. 8.
- ² O. Janelidze, *Essays on the History of Georgian-Russian Relations*, Tbilisi, 2013, p. 206-207.
- ³ N. Jordania, *My Past*, Tbilisi, 1990, p. 107.
- ⁴ Г. Хундадзе, Советская власть и Грузинское посольство в России, 23 июня 1918 г. - 8 марта 1920 г. Тб., 1920, с. 29-30.
- ⁵ Newspaper "Georgia", February 16, 1920.
- ⁶ <http://rushist.com/index.php/denikin-4/777-2-polozhenie-sovetskoj-rossii-k-kontsu-1918>
- ⁷ The Moscow negotiations ended with the signing of the treaty on May 7, 1920. Without any preconditions, Soviet Russia recognized the Democratic Republic of Georgia within its historical borders.
- ⁸ According to the unpublished diaries of Akaki Chkhenkeli, members of the government held an emergency meeting on "how our press should react to the Moscow truce." They decided: "Not to diminish the international significance of the truce, but we should not put people to sleep either, because we know the plan of the Bolsheviks - to break the castle from the inside." A. Chkhenkeli, *Diaries*, records of May 10, 1920. TSU, archive of the Study Center-Library of the Democratic Republic of Georgia.
- ⁹ It was well known to the Kremlin that a military-defense alliance was signed between the Democratic Republics of Azerbaijan and Georgia in June 1919, which guaranteed mutual assistance in the event of external aggression.
- ¹⁰ В. Муханов, *Грузинская Демократическая Республика: от первых дней независимости до советизации*, М., 2018, с. 769.
- ¹¹ National Archives of Georgia, Central Historical Archive, Fund 1874, ref. 1, case. 2, pp.26-27.
- ¹² M. Bakhtadze, *Junkers*. <https://www.gfsis.org/ge/blog/view/927>
- ¹³ Many people attended Makashvili's funeral. Metropolitan Leonid performed the final service in honor of the heroically killed junker. The body was carried out of the military temple by the Commander-in-Chief of Georgia, Giorgi Kvinitadze, as well as the Ministers of War, Interior, and Foreign Affairs. Newspaper "Republic of Georgia", May 2 and 8, 1920.
- ¹⁴ L. Toidze, *Intervention, Occupation, Forced Sovietization, Actual Annexation*, Tbilisi, 1991, p. 14.
- ¹⁵ G. Uratadze, *True and False History*, Paris, 1958, p. 79.
- ¹⁶ O. Janelidze, *Shot Freedom*, Tbilisi, 2000, p. 46-47.
- ¹⁷ L. Toidze, *Intervention, Occupation, Forced Sovietization, Actual Annexation*, Tbilisi, 1991, p. 16.
- ¹⁸ O. Janelidze, *Two Russias (Myth and Reality)*, *Essays on Russian Colonial Policy in Georgia*, Book. 1, Tbilisi, 2007, p. 14.
- ¹⁹ А. Андерсен, Московский договор 7 мая 1920 г. и государственные границы Грузии в 1920-21 гг. <https://www.academia.edu>
- ²⁰ В. Джугели, Тяжелый крестьянин (Записки Народногвардейца), Тифл., 1920, с. 207.
- ²¹ Sh. Vadachkoria, *Georgian Social-Democracy in 1917-1921*, Tbilisi, 2001, p. 421.
- ²² Newspaper *Sakhalkho Sakme*, April 30, 1920.
- ²³ Newspaper *Sakhalkho Sakme*, May 8, 1920.
- ²⁴ Newspaper *Ertoba*, May 11, 1920.
- ²⁵ Newspaper *Ertoba*, May 14, 1920.
- ²⁶ N. Jordania, *My Past*, Tbilisi, 1990, p. 107; 116.
- ²⁷ Newspaper *Ertoba*, May 8, 1920.
- ²⁸ Constituent Assembly of Georgia. Stenographic Report, meeting of April 30, 1920, p. 4-7.
- ²⁹ Constituent Assembly of Georgia. Stenographic Report, meeting of April 30, 1920, p. 16.
- ³⁰ Constituent Assembly of Georgia. Stenographic Report, meeting of April 30, 1920, p. 25.; Also, A. Bendianishvili, *The First Republic of Georgia (1918-1921)*, Tbilisi, 2001, p. 307.
- ³¹ Constituent Assembly of Georgia. Stenographic Report, meeting of April 30, 1920, p. 41
- ³² Newspaper *Ertoba*, May 6, 1920.
- ³³ Newspaper *Sakhalkho Sakme*, May 4, 1920
- ³⁴ А. Ганин, Советская военная разведка в Грузии в 1920-1921 годах. Миссия Павла Сытина. Государственное управление. Электронный вестник. Выпуск № 43. Апрель 2014 г. с. 239.

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